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I. INTRODUCTION 
Lars Noah provides an important analysis of a thorny 
question—does the deactivation of a pacemaker or other 
implanted cardiac device1 constitute permissible withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment or impermissible euthanasia?  As Noah 
observes, other scholars have addressed the legal questions at stake, 
but not in the sustained way that he does.  His article provides an 
impressive consideration of the issue and will provide valuable 
guidance to policymakers and scholars. 
Why is the issue so difficult?  On one hand, cardiac devices are 
forms of “artificial” medical treatment like ventilators, dialysis, or 
feeding tubes, and the law has clearly established the right to have 
any of those other treatments discontinued.  On the other hand, 
implanted cardiac devices can become integrated into the patient’s 
 
 †   Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law and Co-director of the Hall Center for 
Law and Health, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.  MD, JD, 
Harvard University. 
 1.  Noah discusses pacemakers, cardioverter-defibrillators, and left 
ventricular assist devices.  A pacemaker maintains a normal heartbeat for the 
patient; a cardioverter-defibrillator can electrically jolt the patient’s heart back to a 
normal heartbeat from a life-threatening, abnormal heartbeat and can also act as a 
pacemaker; and a left ventricular assist device is a mechanical pump that helps the 
heart pump blood through the body’s circulatory system.  Lars Noah, Turn the Beat 
Around?: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-Assist Devices, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV 1229, 
1232–35 (2013). 
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body in a way that makes them seem like nearly perfect substitutes 
for the person’s failed cells.  In this view, deactivating a pacemaker 
is not so much like removing a ventilator or discontinuing dialysis 
as it is like disabling a transplanted heart, which would constitute 
an act of euthanasia.2 
As Noah asks us, how do we decide which is the better analogy 
for an implanted cardiac device, a ventilator or a transplanted 
heart? 
II. THE PATIENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION 
According to Mohamed Rady and Joseph Verheijde, the 
answer turns on the patient’s medical condition.3  If the patient is 
dying from a massive stroke or other life-threatening illness, then 
deactivation is permissible.  The life-threatening illness is the real 
cause of the patient’s death.  On the other hand, if the patient is 
not facing death from another cause, then deactivation would be 
tantamount to euthanasia.4  In such a case, the deactivation would 
be the real cause of the patient’s death. 
But as Noah points out, resting the analysis on the presence, or 
not, of a life-threatening illness raises problems for the withdrawal 
of other treatments.  Patients can refuse a ventilator even if they are 
not suffering from a terminal illness.5 
Although Rady and Verheijde draw their line at the wrong 
place, their analysis reflects an important moral intuition.  People 
really do care about a patient’s medical condition when judging the 
propriety of an action that will shorten a patient’s life.  
Withdrawing a ventilator from a patient dying of cancer seems very 
different from withholding a blood transfusion from a young 
mother who suffered substantial bleeding during childbirth.  
Similarly, deactivating pacemakers in people who are otherwise 
healthy seems very different from deactivating implanted 
defibrillators6 in patients who are in the final stages of a terminal 
illness and do not want to be resuscitated in the event that their 
 
 2.  Id. at 1229–1230, 1250–52. 
 3.  Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheijde, Letter, When Is Deactivating an 
Implanted Cardiac Device Physician-Assisted Death? Appraisal of the Lethal Pathophysiology 
and Mode of Death, 14 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1086, 1086–87 (2011). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See Noah, supra note 1, at 1253. 
 6.  An implanted cardioverter-defibrillator can electrically jolt the patient’s 
heart back to a normal heartbeat from a life-threatening, abnormal heartbeat in 
addition to acting as a pacemaker.  Id. at 1233–34. 
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hearts stop beating. 
Indeed, at one time, end-of-life law did condition a patient’s 
right to refuse treatment on the patient’s prognosis.  Consider, for 
example, the landmark decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in the case of Karen Ann Quinlan.7  Under the superseded Quinlan 
standard, individuals could exercise a right to refuse treatment 
once their prognosis became sufficiently dim, but not when their 
prognosis was reasonably good.8 
If we followed the Quinlan approach, we would conclude that 
some device deactivations would be permissible, while others would 
be impermissible.  As Rady and Verheijde suggest, we would 
consider the patient’s medical condition in assessing the 
permissibility of a deactivation.9 
But Quinlan no longer provides the governing legal standard.  
Over time, the law has evolved to the principle that people may 
refuse care regardless of their medical conditions.  One does not 
have to be seriously and irreversibly ill to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment.  All patients have a fundamental right to accept or 
decline any medical treatment that is offered to them.10  It may 
seem troublesome if an otherwise healthy person requests the 
deactivation of a pacemaker, but that is no more troublesome than 
someone rejecting a transfusion of blood that could restore the 
person to excellent health. 
To be sure, we should be worried when the right to refuse 
unwanted treatment results in rejections of simple treatments that 
can restore health, and physicians should make sure that such 
refusals are well grounded in religious beliefs or other persuasive 
justifications.  In the end, though, legal rules leave the treatment 
decision to the patient. 
There are important reasons why the law does not draw 
distinctions among different refusals of life-sustaining treatment 
based on the patient’s medical condition even though the patient’s 
prognosis is an important consideration for people.  In particular, 
 
 7.  In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 8.  Id. at 664. 
 9.  Rady & Verheijde, supra note 3, at 1086.  Other scholars have proposed 
different standards.  For example, Lynn Jansen would consider the device’s 
physical location (inside or outside the patient’s body), its duration of use, and its 
functional role.  Lynn A. Jansen, Hastening Death and the Boundaries of the Self, 20 
BIOETHICS 105, 110 (2006); Noah, supra note 1, at 1244. 
 10.  See DAVID ORENTLICHER, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & MARK A. HALL, BIOETHICS 
AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 247–51 (2d ed. 2008). 
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it would be very problematic for the state to tell some patients that 
the quality of their lives is sufficiently dismal that they can choose 
death while telling other patients that the quality of their lives is 
sufficiently good that they must choose life.  These are not the 
kinds of judgments that governments should be making for their 
citizens.  Hence, the law allows all persons the right to refuse 
treatment.11 
And as I have argued previously, society is comfortable with a 
broad right to refuse treatment because the typical refusal of 
treatment is made by, or for, someone who is seriously and 
irreversibly ill.  The classic court cases involve patients who suffer 
from permanent unconsciousness, advanced dementia, or other 
debilitating illnesses.  For the most part, an unlimited right to 
refuse treatment has the practical effect of life-sustaining treatment 
being withdrawn from patients who have a poor prognosis.12 
The same would be true for patients who want their cardiac 
devices to be deactivated.  Although a relatively healthy person 
could ask to have a pacemaker turned off, it is far more likely that 
seriously ill patients would want to have their pacemakers 
deactivated.13 
In sum, a rule permitting all patients—regardless of their 
medical conditions—to have their cardiac devices deactivated 
would be consistent with the usual rules allowing all patients to 
have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn. 
While it may not be possible to distinguish among different 
kinds of device deactivations based on the patient’s medical 
condition, there are alternative bases for identifying some device 
deactivations as euthanasia. 
 
 
 
 11.  DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: MAKING MORAL THEORY 
WORK IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 65–68 (2001). 
 12.  Id. at 67–68.  And some trial courts will order treatment for patients with 
a good prognosis, even though their decisions will be overridden later by an 
appellate court.  ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 10, at 251. 
 13.  Of course, there are times when people with good prognoses will 
nevertheless refuse life-sustaining treatment, whether the treatments are 
ventilators or pacemakers.  But most such refusals are based on sincerely held 
religious beliefs.  In addition, as discussed, society does not want the government 
to decide when someone is sick enough to decline treatment. 
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III. REPLACING VERSUS SUPPLEMENTING AN ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 
The distinction between the permissible removal of a 
ventilator and the impermissible removal of a transplanted heart is 
helpful in drawing lines between permissible and impermissible 
device deactivations.  A ventilator supplements the patient’s 
respiratory capacity but does not replace it.  Ventilated patients can 
draw on both the ventilator and their lungs for oxygen.  Thus, 
when ventilators are withdrawn, patients can fall back on their own 
respiratory capacity.  If the remaining capacity is insufficient to 
sustain life, then we can attribute the patient’s death to the 
patient’s medical condition, rather than to the withdrawal of the 
ventilator.  A transplanted heart, on the other hand, replaces the 
patient’s cardiac capacity.  Transplanted patients can draw only on 
the new heart for cardiac function.  If a transplanted heart were 
removed, the patient would not be able to resort to his or her own 
cardiac capacity, for that would have been taken away by doctors at 
the time of the transplant. 
Thus, we might conclude that deactivation of a cardiac device 
would constitute euthanasia when two things are true: the device 
supplies a cardiac function that is essential to maintaining the 
patient’s life, and the surgery to implant the device included steps 
that permanently disabled the patient’s own ability to provide the 
function.  In such cases, the patient could not survive without the 
device, just as the heart transplant recipient could not survive 
without the new heart.  For example, if a pacemaker were 
implanted to maintain a normal heartbeat, and the implantation 
disabled the functioning of the patient’s heartbeating cells, then 
deactivation would look like euthanasia.  Similarly, if a left 
ventricular assist device were implanted to pump blood from the 
patient’s heart to the rest of the body, and the implantation 
disabled the patient’s ventricular function, then deactivation of the 
device would look like euthanasia.  But if the patient’s heart 
retained its own capacity to function—at whatever level remained 
after the damage from the patient’s illness—then deactivation of 
the device would look like a kind of treatment withdrawal. 
Under a distinction between supplementing and replacing an 
essential bodily function, deactivation of cardiac devices generally 
would not constitute euthanasia.  Pacemakers supplement the 
heart’s own capacity to generate a heartbeat, cardioverter-
defibrillators supplement the heart’s ability to maintain a good 
rhythm, and left ventricular assist devices supplement the left 
5
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ventricle’s ability to pump blood to the aorta.14  As Noah observes, 
all of these devices are “cardiac-assist devices.”15 
Note how this distinction between supplementing and 
replacing an essential bodily function comports with a key 
justification for the distinction between treatment withdrawal and 
euthanasia.  Physicians may try to relieve a patient’s suffering by 
withdrawing various treatments, even if there is a high risk of death 
from the withdrawals.  However, physicians cannot try to relieve a 
patient’s suffering by fully disabling an essential body function.  
Thus, for example, if a physician withdrew a ventilator and also 
administered a drug that blocked the patient’s own pulmonary 
function, then we would have euthanasia.  Death can be anticipated 
and even likely, but it cannot be the inevitable result of the 
physician’s actions. 
Would it always constitute euthanasia to remove a device that 
replaced, rather than supplemented, an essential cardiac function?  
Would future recipients of a total artificial heart never be able to 
have their hearts deactivated?  If we were to apply a strict definition 
of euthanasia, we would include deactivation of any device that 
replaced, rather than supplemented, an essential cardiac function. 
But we might want to take a less restrictive approach.  We 
might want to look more deeply into the reasons why we do not 
treat withdrawals of ventilators, dialysis, or other treatments as 
euthanasia.  This takes us to another consideration. 
IV. PERFECT VERSUS IMPERFECT REPLACEMENTS 
From the distinction between withdrawing a ventilator and 
disabling a transplanted heart, we can identify a second potential 
basis for distinguishing between permissible withdrawal of 
treatment and impermissible euthanasia.  Transplanted hearts not 
only replace the recipients’ own hearts, they seemingly constitute a 
perfect replacement.  A new heart is integrated into the recipient’s 
body so that it functions in the same way as the recipient’s original 
heart. 
Why does this matter?  A key reason for permitting patients to 
refuse unwanted treatment lies in the fact that all medical 
 
 14.  James C. Fang, Rise of the Machines—Left Ventricular Assist Devices as 
Permanent Therapy for Advanced Heart Failure, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2282, 2282–83 
(2009). 
 15.  Noah, supra note 1, at 1234 (emphasis added). 
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treatments come with risks as well as benefits.  Cancer 
chemotherapy may eradicate tumor cells, but it also may kill 
normal cells.  No treatment is purely beneficial.  Because a 
treatment decision involves a weighing of benefits and detriments, 
and different people may weigh the benefits and detriments 
differently, we leave it up to the patient to make the decision.  And 
we leave it up to the patient even when the benefits are seemingly 
great and the detriments seemingly minor.  Patients may refuse 
antibiotics for a life-threatening pneumonia or a blood transfusion 
for a severe loss of blood, just as they may refuse chemotherapy for 
metastatic cancer.16 
But if an implant were to serve as a perfect replacement for the 
person’s original tissues or organ, there would not be any risks to 
offset benefits.  There would not be any drawbacks to the implant 
that would make it less desirable than the original heart,17 and the 
patient’s interest in having the implant deactivated would dissipate.  
Hence, we might conclude that device deactivation constitutes 
euthanasia only if the device replaces an essential cardiac function 
and the device is a perfect replacement for the function.  Both 
conditions would have to be satisfied.18 
 
 16.  At one time, the law did take into account the burdensomeness of a life-
sustaining treatment in deciding whether a patient had the right to refuse the 
treatment.  Earlier I mentioned the Quinlan court’s emphasis on the prognosis of 
the patient—the more dismal the prognosis, the stronger the patient’s interest in 
refusing unwanted medical treatment.  In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 
1976).  The Quinlan court also rested the right to refuse treatment on the nature 
of the treatment—the more burdensome the treatment, the stronger the patient’s 
interest in refusing it.  Id.  Just as the Quinlan standard has been superseded with 
respect to the patient’s prognosis, it also has been superseded with respect to the 
burdensomeness of the treatment.  Patients may weigh for themselves the extent 
to which a treatment’s burden should be taken into account.  ORENTLICHER ET AL., 
supra note 10, at 248–49. 
 17.  To be sure, there would have been risks involved with the surgery to 
implant the cardiac device, but we are considering here the risks from leaving a 
device inside the patient. 
 18.  This alternative approach is similar to one that has been proposed by 
Daniel Sulmasy and that Noah discusses.  Daniel P. Sulmasy, Within You/Without 
You: Biotechnology, Ontology, and Ethics, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. (Supp. 1) 69, 71–
72 (2008); Noah, supra note 1, at 1243–1248.  There are some important 
differences between Sulmasy’s approach and mine.  First, he bases his approach 
on the principle that deactivation of implanted therapies constitutes euthanasia 
when an implant “participates in the organic unity of the patient” such that it “has 
become ‘a part of the patient,’” Sulmasy, supra, at 71, rather than when the 
implant poses no risks to the patient’s health.  In addition, Sulmasy does not 
require the implanted device to be a perfect replacement.  The closer to 
perfection, the more likely that deactivation would constitute euthanasia, but a 
7
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Of course, even heart transplants come with some risks.  
Patients must take drugs to suppress their bodies’ immune 
response to a transplant so the transplant will not be “rejected.”  
And these drugs have side effects, including putting the patient at 
higher risk of cancer.  Accordingly, even though a patient would 
not be free to have the transplanted heart removed, the patient 
would retain the right to stop taking immunosuppressive drugs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is not surprising that many scholars view the deactivation of 
a cardiac implant differently than withdrawal of a treatment that 
remains outside a person’s body.  Cardiac devices can become 
integrated into the recipient’s body in a way that makes them seem 
more like an organ transplant than a ventilator or other artificial 
treatment. 
But consideration of ethics and law leads us to the principle 
that what really matters is whether the device supplements or 
replaces the patient’s own capacity and possibly whether the device 
is an imperfect or perfect replacement.  At a minimum, device 
deactivation would constitute euthanasia only if the device replaced 
the patient’s own capacity.  It also might be necessary that the 
device be a perfect replacement for the patient’s own capacity 
before its deactivation should be considered euthanasia. 
 
 
device apparently could fall somewhat short of being a perfect replacement and 
still have its deactivation considered to be an act of euthanasia.  Id. at 71–72.  
Finally, it is not clear whether Sulmasy takes account of the extent to which the 
device replaces rather than supplements the body’s own capacity.  That 
consideration may be implicit in his analysis, id. at 72, but it is not an explicit 
factor. 
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